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1. Introduction
International movements of workers between OECD countries have steadily increased over the
last 50 years. According to OECD data, this trend clearly intensified as of the early 1980s.1
Historically, migration has always been a labor market alternative strategy for economic agents.
In the face of adverse economic developments, households or workers may choose to migrate to
a particular external country (from a set of alternative destinations) based on considerations
that are essentially related to expectations regarding future income. Such decisions are gen-
erally based on their perceptions of current and future economic conditions both within their
country of origin and in a number of potential destinations. Although many other factors are
relevant for migration decisions, this paper focuses on the role of short-run economic factors
in shaping the migration choice, and in particular on the role of business cycle fluctuations
and employment prospects.
For many years, economists have considered labour mobility as an important macroeconomic
adjustment mechanism. The literature on optimum currency areas pioneered by Robert
Mundell in 1961, has underscored the role of labor mobility as an adjustment mechanism
within a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks between the participating countries
or regions. The criterion of labour mobility has been used as a key measure in assessing
whether or not a particular area represents a so-called optimum currency area. Indeed, during
the 90s, numerous studies disqualified Europe as an optimum currency area because of its lack
of labour mobility. In contrast, Blanchard and Katz (1992) argued that labour mobility could
be seen as a dominant adjustment mechanism in reaction to transitory fluctuations in the
United States. In the absence of reliable data on labour movements, the supporting evidence
was however obtained via an indirect analysis based on a VAR approach involving price, wage
and unemployment dynamics. One of the underlying assumptions used to infer the degree
of labour mobility is that mobility of workers will induce wage and employment adjustment.
This is a debatable assumption in the light of recent literature on the impact of immigration
on wages (see among others Borjas et al. (1996), Card (2001), Docquier et al. (2013) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2012)). As an alternative to this indirect approach, this paper proposes
a direct analysis of the relationship between labour mobility and business cycle fluctuations,
taking advantage of new data on migration flows and building on recent developments in mi-
crofounded estimable gravity models. In other words, our aim is to tackle an old problem with
a fresh approach.
In particular, we test how international migration flows react to economic fluctuations in a
sample of mostly OECD countries. To do so, we build and use data of annual migration
flows between about 30 countries over the 1980-2010 period. We also focus on the European
Monetary Union (EMU) and on the impact of the Schengen agreement on the degree of labour
mobility between EU countries. Such an investigation is useful in assessing whether Europe
1Cf. OECD, International Migration Outlook 2007.
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may be more of an OCA ex-post rather than ex-ante.2 If the integration process itself leads
to a change in the sensitivity of labour mobility to asymmetric shocks, this in turn lowers the
need to rely on alternative adjustment mechanisms within a monetary union.
Our analysis belongs to the extensive literature on the determinants of migration. Up to now,
this literature has mostly focused on long-run factors of economic, geographic, cultural and
demographic natures.3 We build on this extensive literature and extend it by looking at the
specific marginal role of short-run factors such as the business cycle and the employment rate.
In doing so, we integrate the traditional impact of long-run factors identified in the previous
literature in order to isolate the specific role of the short-run variables.
There is, however, a body of recent literature acknowledging the importance of short-run
factors. Coulombe (2006) empirically investigates the determinants of internal labor mobility
in Canada. He finds an important role for the wage differentials between Canadian provinces
but finds no impact from business cycle fluctuations. Simpson and Sparber (2012) disentangle
the reaction of immigrant inflows to short-run and long-run factors between U.S. States. Other
papers also consider these short-run factors in an international perspective. Mc Kenzie et
al. (2014) focus on the impact of economic fluctuations in destinations on the intensity of
emigration from the Philippines. Bertoli et al. (2013b) analyze the reaction of German
immigration flows to the onset of the economic crisis in Europe. We contribute to this literature
by generalizing this type of approach to a large set of origin and destination countries over a
period including various episodes of macroeconomic fluctuations. In turn, the use of a large
pool of origin and destination countries observed over a relatively long period gives additional
flexibility in the empirical identification of the factors. One important element is our use
of relative measures of business cycle fluctuations and employment rates allowing to capture
different situations in both origin and destination countries.
Our empirical strategy directly results from the derivation of a random utility model commonly
used in the literature of determinants of migration (Borjas (1987), Grogger and Hanson (2011),
Beine et al. (2011)). The income maximization framework allows the modelling of migrants’
choices of destination from a set of alternative destinations. The traditional benchmark model
is extended to allow some role for short-run factors. In the model, business cycles and current
employment rates exert an ultimate role on migration as they signal the evolution of future
employment opportunities for economic agents. The theoretical equilibrium then leads to a
pseudo-gravity model of international migration which can be readily estimated (Anderson,
2Work in this area was primarily conducted in the 90s, but using different criteria. See for instance Frankel
and Rose (1998) relating trade integration to the asymmetry in business cycle fluctuations.
3Since the early work of Mayda (2010), empirical literature on the determinants of migration has developed
rapidly. For instance, among many others, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) focus on the role of education. Grogger
and Hanson (2011) look at the role of wages while Rosenzweig (2006) focuses on skill prices. Other papers
such as Beine et al. (2011) or McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) look at the role of networks. Clark et al. (2007)
investigate the role of distance in a broad sense. Beine and Parsons (2014) focus on push factors like climatic
shocks and natural disasters. Bertoli and Fernandez-Huerta Moraga (2012) investigate the role of bilateral
migration policies.
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(2011)).
To sum up, our contribution is thus fourfold. First, we look at the importance of cyclical shocks
in explaining international migration flows in a cross-country perspective. Second, we derive
an empirical specification with theoretical microfoundations. Third, we compile a complete
dataset of annual gross bilateral flows covering a large set of countries over 1980-2010 and
including macroeconomic indicators both at origin and at destination. Fourth, this overall
framework allows us to account for short-run and long-run factors within the same model.
Our results suggest that short-run economic developments (business cycles fluctuations and
employment prospects) affect the level of bilateral migrant flows on top of the long-run factors
such as the wage differential. As a by-product of the empirical analysis, we also provide
evidence that the Schengen agreement and the introduction of the euro significantly raised
international mobility between countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical founda-
tions of our empirical model. Section 3 describes in detail the data used, thereby providing a
number of stylized facts on migration flows. Section 4 outlines the econometric model(s) and
presents the main empirical results and section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical background: the income maximization approach
Our theoretical foundation is derived from the income maximization framework, which is used
to identify the main determinants of international migration and to pin down our empirical
specification. The income maximization approach was first introduced by Roy (1951) and
Borjas (1987) and further developed by Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2011).
It is also directly related to the extensive literature dealing with discrete choice models initiated
by the seminal work of McFadden (1984). This approach allows to capture migrants’ choices of
destination from a set of alternative destinations. The theoretical equilibrium leads to the use
of pseudo-gravity models of international migration which can be readily estimated (on this
point, see Anderson (2011)). One of the main strengths of the income maximization approach
is its ability to generate predictions in line with the recent (macro-economic) literature on
international migration. By grounding our empirical specification in a theory with a well-
established track record, we try to eliminate any ad-hoc specifications and to rationalize the
obtained empirical relationships. This model has been successfully applied to analysis of the
impact of various determinants of international migration. For instance, it has been used to
capture the specific role of wage differentials (Grogger and Hanson (2011)), the significance of
social networks (Beine et al. (2011)), the "brain-drain" phenomenon (Gibson and McKenzie,
(2011)) and the impact of climatic factors (Beine and Parsons (2014)).
Our model considers homogeneous agents who decide their optimal location. Agents therefore
maximize their expected utility across the full set of possible destinations which includes the
home country as well as all possible foreign countries globally. In this study, we analyze
migrations among developed countries. All included countries are therefore considered as
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potential origin and destination countries. Time is included and the model is estimated over a
period ranging from 1980 onwards using annual data. In contrast with the benchmark model
of Random Utility Maximisation used by McFadden (1984), we do not assume full employment
at origin and destination. In the traditional model, agents do not face any uncertainty about
future employment, so that what matters for their optimal decision is only the amplitude of
wage differential and the level of migration costs. In a world with unemployment rates closer
to 10% rather than to what can be viewed as the natural unemployment rate, this assumption
may well be too strong. We therefore extend the traditional RUM approach and assumed
that agents will form expectations of future employment based on information provided by
the current state of the economy. This involves the current level of economic activity (here,
the business cycle) and the current employment rate.
2.1. Utility, income, unemployment and expectations
An individual’s utility is log-linear in expected income (E(yi,t)) and depends on the charac-
teristics of his country of residence, the characteristics of any particular destination among
the set of potential destinations, and the costs of moving between the origin and the selected
destination.4 The utility of an individual born in country i and staying in country i at time t
is given by:
uii,t = ln(E(yi,t)) + Ai,t + εi,t (1)
where Ai,t denotes country i’s characteristics (amenities, public expenditures, social benefits
and other push or pull factors) and εi,t is an iid extreme-value distributed random term. The
utility related to migration from country i to country j at time t is given by:
uij,t = ln(E(yj,t)) + Aj,t − Cij,t(.) + εj,t (2)
where Cij,t(.) denotes the migration costs of moving from i to j at time t. In this framework,
εi,t satisfies the hypothesis of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (see McFadden,
1984).5
Agents form expectations regarding the future incomes prevailing in all possible destinations
including their country of origin. Expected incomes in country i and country j are given
by the expected income conditional upon being employed (the average wage level) times the
expected probability of being employed in that country. We do not consider here the role of
4The assumption of a log-linear utility function is discussed in Anderson (2011). Note that in contrast with
utility linear in income, the log-linear utility implies constant relative risk aversion (with a degree of relative
risk aversion equal to 1). Endogeneizing the wages, Anderson (2011) derives a pseudo-gravity model including
inward and outward multilateral resistance for a degree of relative risk aversion equal to 2.
5This hypothesis implies a constant rate of substitution between alternative destinations. In the econometric
framework which is derived from this model, deviations from the IIA hypothesis might lead to inconsistent
estimators. Therefore, we check after estimation that our estimates are robust to the successive drop of the
various destination countries included in the sample.
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unemployment benefits at origin as well as at destination and suppose these are equal to zero
for the sake of simplicity. For country i, expected income is given by:
E(yi,t) = E(yi,t|ei,t = 1).E(ei,t) = wi,t.E(ei,t). (3)
where ei,t = 1 if the individual is employed in country i at time t, 0 otherwise.E(ei,t) stands
for the expected employment status. Expected income under employment E(yi,t|ei,t = 1) is
given by the average level wi,t. For country j, we have:
E(yj,t) = E(yj,t|ej,t = 1).E(ej,t) = wj,t.E(ej,t). (4)
It is important to make a distinction in the timing of adjustment. In the short run, assuming
sticky wages, business cycle fluctuations tend to affect only employment probabilities ei,t and
ej,t. This hypothesis is consistent with the evidence of sticky real wages in most developed
countries, especially given the annual frequency of the data we consider in the empirical part.
In the long run, it is of course possible that wages will adjust. Here we disregard the long-run
adjustments and focus on the short-run dynamics.6
In turn, agents form expectations regarding the probability of being employed in the future.
Given that there is uncertainty about the future stance of the economy, the expected proba-
bility of employment is supposed to be given by a mixture of the current level of employment
in the economy and its current cyclical state. Migrants use both types of information since
they encompass different types of information, both in terms of economic mechanisms and in
terms of forecast horizon of the employment rate in the country.
The current employment rate is supposed to exert some signal to the migrants about the
future rate of employment in the economy through extrapolative expectations. Migrants can
directly observe the current employment rate which provides a good prediction of the next
period employment rate for a given level of business cycle. The current level of employment rate
integrates to a certain extent the impact of past business cycles and some structural effect of the
labour market. The current business cycle provides some information which is more forward
looking in terms of future employment rates. The rationale behind such a signalling process
refers to the feedback mechanisms from output changes to unemployment as captured for
instance by Okun’s law. This law relates the business cycle and future labour market tightness
at the aggregate level. Empirical literature has shown the relevance of this law in many
developed countries and has also documented that there are lags in the transmission of the
cycle to the labour market.7 While positive, the correlation between the current employment
6This adjustment can take different forms. One possibility is that there is a compensating mechanism
triggered by migration, with wages rising with the decrease in employment in a given location. A special case
is the Harris-Todaro (1970) one in which compensation is total, i.e. expected incomes E(yj,t) are equalized
across locations. Pissarides and McMaster (1990) find that in the long run, relative wages in British regions
compensate for unemployment differences at a rate of 3 for 1.
7Early estimates of the transmission lags in the Okun’s law amount to about 6 to 8 quarters, i.e. 1.5 to
6
rate and the business cycle is far from 1, reflecting the complex dynamics between the current
employment rate and the business cycle. 8
Based on these assumptions, the expected probability of employment in country i is given by:
E(Prob(ei,t = 1)) = (1− uri,t)θ(bci,t)λ. (5)
where uri,t denotes the unemployment rate and bci,t is a business cycle indicator. This indicator
may be expressed on a 0 − 100% scale to match the metric in the employment rate. θ is a
parameter capturing the importance of current employment rate for predicting unemployment
while λ captures the importance of business cycles in the expectation process.
2.2. Equilibrium migration rate
At the individual level, the probability to migrate to j depends on the specific distribution for
the disturbances εi,t. McFadden (1974) shows that if εi,t follows an i.i.d. type 1 extreme value
distribution, the probability of migrating from i to j can be expressed as:
Pr
[
uij,t = max
k
uik,t
]
=
exp[Uij,t]∑
k
exp[Uik,t]
(6)
At the aggregate level, the corresponding value of this probability takes the form of the share
of natives choosing to migrate to j, i.e. by Nij,t
Ni,t
where Ni,t is the size of the native population
in country i at time t and Nij,t is the number of migrants in the i-j migration corridor at time
t. Similarly, Nii,t stands for the proportion of workers remaining in their country of origin
during period t. Substituting (1) and (2) into (6) yields:
Nij,t
Ni,t
=
exp [ln(wj,t) + θln(1− urj,t) + λln(bcj,t) + Aj,t − Cij,t]∑
k exp [ln(wk,t) + θln(1− urk,t) + λln(bck,t) + Ak,t − Cik,t]
(7)
Likewise we may compute the equilibrium rate of stayers over natives, giving the equilibrium
probability for a native to stay in his or her own country rather than emigrating as:
Nii,t
Ni,t
=
exp [ln(wi,t) + θln(1− uri,t) + λln(bci,t) + Ai,t]∑
k exp [ln(wk,t) + θln(1− urk,t) + λln(bck,t) + Ak,t − Cik,t]
(8)
2 years. For some recent evidence on Okun’s law in OECD countries, see among others Ball et al. (2013)
Gordon (2010) and Lee (2000). In general the empirical literature points to the relevance of Okun’s law for all
developed countries, although with different sensitivities of unemployment rate to output fluctuation. There
is also a general controversy on whether there has been a shift in the average key elasticity and on whether
there are asymmetries in the response of unemployment to output shocks.
8Depending on the measure of the business cycle, the correlation between the relative employment rate and
the relative business cycle is comprised between 0.02 and 0.24.
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The equilibrium bilateral migration rate between i and j is obtained by taking the ratio
(Nij,t/Nii,t) at equilibrium :
Nij,t
Nii,t
=
exp [ln(wj,t) + θln(1− urj,t) + λln(bcj,t) + Aj,t − Cij,t]
exp [ln(wi,t) + θln(1− uri,t) + λln(bci,t) + Ai,t] (9)
Taking logs, we obtain an expression giving the log of the bilateral migration rate between i
and j over stayers at time t:
ln(
Nij,t
Nii,t
) = ln(
wj,t
wi,t
) + θln(
1− urj,t
1− uri,t ) + λln(
bcj,t
bci,t
) + Aj,t − Ai,t − Cij,t (10)
Expression (10) allows us to identify the main components of the aggregate bilateral migration
rate: (i) the wage differential in the form of the wage ratio (wj,t
wi,t
), (ii) differential in employment
rates, (iii) differential in business cycles; (iv) differential in pull and push factors at destination
Aj,t, and at origin Ai,t; (v) finally the bilateral migration costs between i and j, Cij,t. Given the
absence of unemployment benefits, an increase in current unemployment lowers the probability
of employment for the individual and increases the differential with respect to the potential
destinations. This favors emigration from country i.
Note that by construction, the impact of the relative business cycle on the bilateral migration
rate is proportional to its importance for building expectations of future employment rate. This
reflects the theoretical channel that is favored in the model. Nevertheless, in the empirical
part, the estimated value of λ could also be driven by alternative channels.
2.3. Migration costs
Putting everything together, our cost function may be expressed as:
Cij,t = c(xi, xj, xij, xit, xjt, xt, xijt) (11)
The cost function is supposed to be separable (i) into time-invariant origin country factors
(xi) such as being an island, being landlocked, time-invariant destination country factors (xj)
such as being an island, being landlocked (ii) country pair specific time-invariant (xij) that
include for instance linguistic proximity or bilateral migration policies that are constant over
the period under investigation, (iii) time-varying origin country factors (xit) that include for
instance human capital level of the country, (iv) time-varying destination specific factors (xjt)
such as unilateral immigration policies and finally (v) time-invaraint factors common to both
origin and destination countries (vi)time-varying pair-specific factors xijt such as diasporas
at destination or time-varying bilateral policies between the origin and the destination, such
as the Schengen agreement in Europe. Given the data dimension, all those cost components,
except one can be either directly observed or captured by the relevant combination of fixed
effects.
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3. Data
3.1. International migration flows
Estimating equation (10) requires data on bilateral migration flows in gross terms at a busi-
ness cycle frequency level. To the best of our knowledge, there is no ready-to-use dataset
combining these features. The litterature on determinants of migration has mainly exploited
data on stocks of migrants.9 As previous authors who have studied migration flows, we built
our own dataset merging different sources of information.10 Since the required variables were
available only for a large part of OECD countries, we obtain a data containing 24 destination
and 30 origin countries over the period 1980-2010.11 Our data therefore captures an important
share of total international migration to and from OECD countries and covers many major
episodes of economic fluctuations in the modern era.12 We can briefly enumerate some of these
episodes: the recession following the second oil shock in the early 80’s, the recovery of the
late eighties in many OECD countries, the US recession in the early nineties, the European
recession of the mid-nineties, the US expansion in the late nineties and last but not least the
financial crisis in 2008.
Our first source of information for migration flows is the international migration flows dataset
from the UN. 13 This data covers 20 destination countries of our sample. We complement this
sample with the OECD International Migration database.14 We decided to complement the
UN dataset to include four key countries in our analysis (namely, Greece, Ireland, Portugal
9For instance, two well-known cross-country data on international migration, namely Docquier and Marfouk
(2006) on the one hand and Özden et al. (2011) on the other hand are suited more for capturing the long-
run determinants of international migration. Docquier et al. (2009) provide bilateral migration stocks with
information about education levels (as well as gender) for two years only, 1990 and 2000. Özden et al. (2011)
provide a complete coverage at the global level of bilateral stocks for 5 years (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000)
by gender only.
10For instance, Belot and Ederveen (2012) build their own dataset to analyse the role of cultural barriers
between 22 OECD countries over the 1990-2003 period. Pedersen et al. (2008) build migration flows for
27 OECD countries and more than 120 origin countries for the 1990-2000 period. They combine information
provided by the national statistical offices of the destination countries with OECD data extracted from "Trends
in International Migration".
11The list of destination countries is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, Spain and the UK. We include 6 additional origin
countries: Croatia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia
12Comparing our data with the most comprehensive data provided by Docquier et al. (2009), we cover
most of the migration process between OECD countries. Our data do not include 6 destination countries (out
of 30) covered by Docquier et al. (2009): Japan, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Turkey and South Africa. Still,
the 24 common destination countries represent respectively 82 and 84% of total migration stocks captured in
Docquier et al. (2009) respectively for 1990 and 2000; and they represent 96% of skilled migrants observed in
1990 and 2000.
13This dataset is provided by the United Nations Population division. More information may be found on
http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/
14Downloadable on http://stats.oecd.org/
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and the United Kingdom). Aware that aggregating data from multiple sources raises compa-
rability issues we conduct some robustness checks in section 4.2.1.
These two databases provide, for all destination countries, annual migrant inflows by origin
country. They gather immigration statistics obtained from National Authorities. Countries
do not necessarily adopt the same collection process and may use different criteria to identify
immigrants. In order to obtain a sample as harmonized as possible we keep, when possible, the
same criterion for all the destinations. Most countries in our sample use the residence criterion,
others use the citizenship criterion and only one country uses the country of birth criterion.
Appendix A provides greater details on the characteristics of our immigration data.15 The
residence criterion allows us to capture better short-term mobility since it covers the last ori-
gin of migrants, while citizenship and birth criteria capture respectively long-term immigrants
and immigrants from a permanent origin. The residence criterion involves the delivery of a
residence permit, the duration of stay considered varies among countries.16
The resulting dataset contains 21,576 observations but is quite unbalanced. Overall we have a
significant number of missing observations but very few zero values. We count 8,090 missing
observations i.e 37.5% of all observations. In contrast, we have only 67 observations corre-
sponding to zero immigration flows, i.e. less than 0.5% of the non-missing observations. In
terms of econometric implications, the low occurrence of zeros allows us to use the traditional
panel data methods as opposed to the alternative techniques such as Poisson Maximum like-
lihood or hurdle models.17
The proportion of missing values is unequally distributed across destination countries, reflect-
ing differences in size and quality of data collection. In short, there is a large proportion of
missing values in relatively small destination countries such as Greece, Portugal and Israel.
There are nevertheless exceptions to that rule, with large developed countries such as France
and the UK displaying a relatively high number of missing observations.
Figure 1 reports the number of zeroes and missing observations for the bilateral flows over the
full period 1980-2010 for each destination.
[Figure 1 about here.]
3.2. Wages, business cycles, employment rates
Estimating the equilibrium equation (10) requires data on wages, business cycles and unem-
ployment rates for destination countries. Many cross-country analyses of migration flows face
15For countries for which it was possible, we checked the correlation between immigration flows defined with
the three alternative criteria (residence, citizenship, birth). We get quite a positive correlation in the range
of 0.8. We also conduct robustness regressions on a restricted sample containing only countries using the
residence criterion.
16More information is available on http://esa.un.org/unmigration/MigrationFlows.html
17On this point, see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). These techniques are specifically designed to deal
with the statistical consequences of the presence of a large proportion of zeros for the dependent variable.
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issues in finding comparable measures of wages across countries. Grogger and Hanson (2011)
definitely provide the best approach with respect to this issue, recovering wages by education
level from the observed wage distribution in microeconomic databases specific to each desti-
nation country. This is made possible however by the relatively low number of countries (only
13) considered in their analysis. Some studies capture wages by proxies such as GDP per
capita, which might imply significant measurement errors in some cases. 18 Other analyses do
not directly observe wage data but capture their role through the use of fixed effects. 19 In this
paper, in contrast to those previous studies, we use explicit measures of wages at destination.
For the sake of data harmonization we exploit a unique source for all these macroeconomic
variables. The data are from the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, they provide wage,
GDP and unemployment rate series for all countries of our sample. For most countries, these
series span the whole period studied but in some cases (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the
UK) series begin later.
We extract cyclical stance from GDP data and use two different measures. The first one relies
on the deviation from GDP trend and uses the traditional Hodrick-Prescott filter for that
purpose. Given the annual frequency, we extract the trend based on a value of the smoothing
parameter λ equal to 400. As an alternative, we use a more simple measure based on the
annual growth rate of GDP.
3.3. Bilateral variables
In addition to these measures, we also capture time-varying dyadic variables (xijt in terms
of expression (11)) thought to affect bilateral migration costs. We use three main measures
to tackle integration between countries: (i) Schengen agreement between (a subset of) EU
countries, (ii) other bilateral agreements favouring the international mobility of workers and
(iii) joint membership of the European Monetary Union. These measures are explained below.
The exact construction and sources of the bilateral agreements are also described more in
details in Appendix A.
The Schengen variable (Schengenij,t) is a time-moving dyadic variable taking 1 if both coun-
tries had implemented the Schengen rule at time t, and 0 otherwise. The Schengen agreement
was progressively signed and implemented by a subset of EU countries and was designed
to favour mobility between EU countries. By harmonizing rules for getting work permits,
these agreements increased labour mobility between the signing countries and provide a com-
plementary frawework with respect to mere EU membership.20 We take into account the
18See for instance Beine and Parsons (2014) who capture wage differentials by differences in GDP per capita
for all origin and destination countries.
19See for instance Beine et al. (2011) and Bertoli and Fernandez-Huerta Moraga (2013a).
20Basically, countries that signed the Schengen agreement tend to transfer the rules of entry and the con-
ditions of work to the European Union. These rules are harmonized. For instance, people migrating within
the Schengen area are not subject to any control at the border. The signatory states to the agreement have
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implementation criterion, i.e. by considering cases in which the country signed and imple-
mented the Schengen rules of people mobility. There is a significant variation of member
and non-member EU countries. 21 There is also a significant variation in terms of timing
between member countries of the Schengen area. 22 Second, we capture the fact that both
the origin and the destination countries belong to the European Monetary Union (EMU) that
for a subset of EU countries was launched in 1999. The use of a common currency between
countries should imply a significant drop in currency conversion costs between the destination
and the origin countries for migrants. It also favours direct comparison of economic aggre-
gates between countries, such as wages and prices. EMU implementation also led to facilities
and economies in terms of international bank transfers. There is also a drop in uncertainty
regarding the converted wage amount at destination due to the full eradication of bilateral
exchange rate volatility. It is important if the prospective migrants intend to remit part of
their earnings to their relatives staying behind. As for the Schengen agreement, the EMUij,t
variable takes 1 if both countries were EMU members at time t, and 0 otherwise. As for the
Schengen agreement, there is a balanced mix of EMU and non-EMU members in our sample
of countries. There is also a significant variation between member countries in terms of timing
of adhesion to the EMU for our sample of origin and destination.
Finally, we capture the existence of bilateral agreements in terms of labour mobility between
countries included in the sample beyond the agreements specific to EU countries. These
bilateral agreements are supposed to facilitate the migration of economic agents through a
set of mechanisms. For example, one mechanism goes through the visa waiving arrangements
for the candidates to migration. We build a dyadic dummy variable Bilateralij,t taking 1 if
there is a bilateral agreement at time t favouring the mobility of workers between countries
i and j, and 0 otherwise. The existence of those bilateral agreements is identified using the
agreements collected by the International Organization of Migration (IOM). Details about the
sources and the exact nature of those agreements are provided in Appendix A. We find that
out of 21576 possible observations, we have 871 observations for which there was a bilateral
agreement of that kind between the two countries at that time. This represents about 3 % of
the observations.
abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external border. Here common rules and procedures are applied
with regard to visas for short stays, asylum requests and border controls. In contrast, the citizens of countries
that are member of the European Union but not of the Schengen area remain subject to the national rules of
each destination country regarding the entry and the conditions of stay in the country. This has also some
consequences for the conditions under which the migrants can work. For instance, in the period analyzed in
our article, in France, citizens from Romania could work, but only in 291 occupations experiencing recruitment
difficulties. This example illustrates that the Schengen agreement is important for job-related migration.
21Among the EU countries, Ireland and the UK and Croatia are not members.
22Basically, implementation for signing members followed three different waves. The first wave took place for
most of the European founders around 1995-1997. A second wave concerning mostly Scandinavian countries
plus Greece occurred around 2000-2001. Finally joining East European countries implemented the Schengen
agreement around 2007.
12
4. Estimation
We start from equation (10) and estimate a benchmark specification that is consistent with
the equilibrium equation. We propose different specifications depending on the specification
of the cost component in equation (11).
4.1. The benchmark specification
Combining equations (10) and (11), we estimate the following benchmark equation:
ln(Nij,t) = β0 + β1ln(wj,t) + β2ln(1− urj,t) + β3(bcj,t) + β4Schengenij,t
+ β5EMUij,t + β6Bilateralij,t[+αij][+αj] + αit + ij,t (12)
Schengenij,t, EMUij,t and Bilateralij,t are respectively dummy variables capturing the joint
participation at time t to the Schengen agreement, the joint participation at time t to the
European Monetary Union and the existence at time t of other bilateral agreements favoring
worker’s mobility between the two countries as defined in the previous section.
Importantly, this specification includes αit fixed effects. The purpose of these effects is many-
fold. First, in terms of the equilibrium equation (10) one can see that αit = ln(Nii,t) +
β1ln(wit) + β2ln(bcit) + β3ln(1 − urit) + c(xit) + c(xi) + c(xt). This means that the αit fixed
effects account for the role of many factors at origin, such as wages, employment rates and
business cycles. The fixed effects also capture the role of migration costs that are specific to
the origin, or those which are common to all countries but move over time. Second, the αit
fixed effects account for the role of ln(Nii,t), i.e. the total number of native workers of country
i staying in their own country at time t. This is important because due to lack of data, we do
not have a direct observable measure for ln(Nii,t). Indeed, in contrast with Beine and Parsons
(2014), we do not have full information regarding emigration flows, and rely only on a subset
of destinations j. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate Nii,t from the population stock (Ni,t
and the full set of emigration flows
∑
kNik,t). The inclusion of αit provides a straightforward
solution to the non observability of ln(Nii,t) and makes sure our specification is in line with the
equilibrium condition. Finally, the inclusion of αit account for multilateral resistance to migra-
tion. Multilateral resistance to migration terms capture the fact that any change in the flow
between i and j will affect the other bilateral relationships. Concepts of multilateral resistance
have been originally identified in literature analysing bilateral trade flows (Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), Anderson (2011)). It has also recently received some specific attention in the
migration literature (see Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013a)).23 In turn, failure to
account for the multilateral resistance to migration might lead to a violation of the underlying
23Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2012, 2013a) propose to capture multilateral resistance to mi-
gration by using the Pesaran CCE estimator. This requires the use of nests of destination countries. The
underlying assumption is that shocks ij,t are correlated across countries belonging to the same nests but are
independent across countries included in different nests. In the context of our study, the exact composition
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independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) hypothesis. The IIA hypothesis underlies the
discrete choice model à la McFadden (1984) in the income maximization approach that we
outlined in section 2. The inclusion of αit allows to control for (inward) multilateral resistance
capturing the incidence of migration costs of the sending countries. This is also the strat-
egy adopted by Ortega and Peri (2013). One way to see if this inclusion does a good job in
controlling for multilateral resistance is to evaluate whether the IIA hypothesis seems to hold
after estimation of the model. On top of that, we include time-invariant dyadic fixed effects
αij. In this set-up, αij = c(xij) in terms of equation (11). In other terms, the dyadic fixed
effects capture the part of the migration costs that are pair-specific and time-invariant.
[Table 1 about here.]
The results are reported in Table 1. Columns (1) and (3) report the results obtained with
the HP component as the measure of the business cycle at destination. Columns (2) and (4)
report the results obtained with the growth rate as the alternative measure of the business
cycle at destination. We estimate each model by OLS and scaled OLS.
Overall, we find evidence in favour of long-run and short-run factors on the bilateral migra-
tion flows. First, and importantly, we find a very robust and stable elasticity for the wage
differential. An increase of around 10% in the wage ratio (due to the increase of the wage at
destination) leads on average to an increase in the bilateral migration flows of about 7.7% (see
Table 1). This is in line with the findings of the existing literature. Nevertheless, on top of
that, we find support for a role of short-run factors, i.e. of business cycles and employment
rates. Starting with the specification including the αij fixed effects, the positive impact of
the relative business cycles is observed regardless of the business cyclical stance measure. The
same holds for the differential employment rates. These results are consistent with the idea
developed in our theoretical framework that the cyclical stance provides an additional signal
to the candidates to migration for choosing the optimal destination. According to this inter-
pretation, this signal is in terms of the future probability of employment for those migrants,
which ultimately affects the expected wage at destination and in turn the net gain derived
from moving to that destination.
The estimation results suggest that short-run factors contribute to the understanding of the
variability of bilateral migration flows. Depending on the estimation method and the measure
and the number of the nests would first rely on arbitrary criteria that could be difficult to justify. Further-
more, the use of 31 time periods along with 30 origin countries would lead to a strong inflation of the number
of included parameters (871*the number of nests). To illustrate, the inclusion of 6 nests as in Bertoli and
Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2012) would lead to 5226 additional parameters to estimate. Since we rely on the
Least Square Dummy Variable approach instead of the within transformation approach -due to the fact that
our panel data set is strongly unbalanced (due to zeros, missing observations over time, missing destinations
for given origins) (see Baltagi, 1995)-, the implementation of that approach would lead to important compu-
tational problems. As a result, while recognizing its value, we disregard the Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas
Moraga (2013a) approach and follow instead the Ortega and Peri (2013) strategy.
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of the business cycle, the decrease in the Root Mean Square Error when adding those factors
lies between 2.9 and 3.2%. While this can sound as a modest contribution, one should not
forget that the model accounts for many unobserved factors through the set of fixed effects.24
While the business cycle seems to enter in migrants’ expectations of future employment rates,
the relative contribution seems to come mostly from the current employment rates. In terms
of economic magnitudes, a rise of 1% in the ratio of employment rates between the destination
and the origin leads to a 5% increase in the bilateral migration rates. The estimated business
cycle elasticities suggest that a 1% differential in growth rates between the origin and the
destination countries leads to a 0.02% increase in the bilateral migration flow (for columns (2)
and (4)). Even though these orders of magnitude seem to be modest, the cumulated effects
over the whole business cycle can be substantial, especially for migration corridors that are
already important.
To give a more tangible assessment of the impact of employment rates, one may for instance
consider the flows from Germany to Italy, which represented between 8,000 and 14,000 mi-
grants over the considered period. Using the fact that a 1% increase in the ratio of employment
rates leads to a 5% increase in bilateral migrations rates, we find that the rise of the ratio of
employment rates, cumulated between 2000 and 2005 (+6.5 points) contributed to a supple-
mentary cumulated flow of immigrants from Germany of 3,740 persons (620 in average per
year). Conversely, when the situation reversed between 2006 and 2008, with a cumulated de-
crease of the ratio of employment rates of -3 points, this contributed to a cumulated decrease
of immigration flows from Germany to Italy of 1,800 persons (600 persons in average per
year). Yet, the contribution of the differential in growth rates between the two countries was
negligible for this couple of partners. To get more substantial contributions of the differential
in growth rates, we can take for example the flows from Romania to Spain, which rose up to
around 174,000 in 2007. Between 2001 and 2008, with growth rates that were significantly
more important in Romania than in Spain, the differential in growth rates contributed to a
cumulated diminution of around 500 immigrants.
An important by-product of our estimation is the impact of the time-varying dyadic factors
affecting the migration costs. We find a positive impact on mobility for the Schengen agree-
ment between EU countries, a positive role for currency unification as well as a positive impact
for the other bilateral agreements. The positive impact of a common currency has been also
found by Ortega and Peri (2013), while the boosting effect of the Schengen agreement was
documented to a certain extent by Beine et al. (2011) in a cross-section context. These two
results are important in terms of our discussion about the optimal nature of the European
24One might be concerned about an omitted variable bias caused by the role of international trade. It is
important to note that most of bilateral trade is already captured through the origin-time fixe effects. Most
determinants of gravity equations arealready present in our specifications (weights, proxied by bilateral fixed
effects for initial levels and complemented by GDP growth; origin-destination fixed effects for distances and
other bilateral characteristics (common language. . . ); agreements or institutional settings (single currency)
that are likely to favour trade. . . ). We therefore do not expect any bias linked to omitted variables due to the
role of international trade.
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Monetary Union. The traditional Optimum Currency Area literature (Mundell, 1961; De
Grauwe, 2009) emphasized the important role of labour mobility in coping with asymmetric
business cycle shocks. Our estimation results show that with respect to labour mobility, the
Schengen agreement as well as the inception of the euro made Europe closer to an Optimum
currency area. This of course does not mean that Europe is or has become an OCA. Never-
theless it shows that integration measures increased the net gains (or decreased the net costs)
derived from the introduction of the euro. For example, migration flows from the Netherlands
to Belgium, which amounted to around 6,000 in the nineties rose to 12,000 in 2007. The cor-
responding impact of the euro area, equal to 14% (Cf. Table 1), would thus represent around
880 migrants.25 Also, the results are in line with the new OCA literature that shows that
the optimal nature of a monetary union is itself endogenous with the monetary unification
process (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010). Frankel and Rose (1998)
show that the optimality of a currency union depends on the degree of asymmetric shocks
within the union, which itself depends on the monetary unification process. The same holds
for the intensity of trade flows. Related to those findings, we show that currency unification
decreases the costs of moving between euro area countries, and therefore increases the scope
of labour mobility as an alternative adjustment mechanism to the flexibility in exchange rates.
The estimates relative to the impact of bilateral agreements in Table 1 are all found positive,
which is in line with the expected impact of bilateral agreements on the migration costs. We
find that the existence of bilateral agreements favouring worker mobility between two countries
raises the bilateral migration flow by 9 to 10 %.
As stressed before, it is important to check whether the validity of the IIA assumption holds
after estimation. An indirect way of evaluating this is to look at the stability of estimated
coefficients when some destinations are dropped from the estimation sample. This method
was used, for example, by Head et al. (1995) for an analysis of location choices in the US by
Japanese manufacturing firms during the 1980’s. We implement this method by dropping one
destination at a time and by plotting the estimated key coefficients. Before examining the
patterns of coefficients, two comments are in order. First, we rely on visual examination only
rather than on a formal test because our sample is strongly unbalanced. It is unbalanced in
several ways. For some country pairs, there may be missing years. For some origins, there
might be missing destinations for the whole time period, and for some destinations, there might
also be missing origins. Therefore, the removal of different destinations might lead to quite
different subsamples. For instance, since the US is the most important destination, removing
the US reduces the sample by a maximum number of observations (30*31=930 data points).
In contrast, removing Romania has little impact on the sample as the Romanian destination
is widely unavailable for most origins. Tests of equality of estimates with different subsamples
25Since the coefficient of the euro area variable is related to a dummy, the corresponding elasticity cannot be
used directly and is equal to (exp(0.14)-1)=0.150. To take another case, flows from Germany to Italy, between
8,000 and 10,000 in the nineties, rose up to 14,000 in 2004, with a contribution of the euro area that would
thus represent around 700 migrants.
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are therefore difficult to implement. Second, the fact that removing different destinations leads
to different subsamples means that our evaluation of the IIA assumption is done assuming
that there is no selection issue here.
Figure 3 reported in Appendix C plots the evolution of the estimated key coefficients of equa-
tion (12) when dropping successively one destination country from the regression.26 Overall,
with few exceptions in terms of destinations (Spain) and in terms of coefficients (βˆ2) of equa-
tion (12), the rolling estimates display quite stable estimated coefficients.27 Comparing the
key estimated coefficients of Table 1 with the range displayed in those figures, we find that
in general the estimated impact is robust to the exclusion of alternative destinations. The
estimate of the wage elasticity (0.87) lies more or less in the middle of the range in terms of
the coefficients displayed in Figure 3. The same basically holds for the other coefficients of in-
terest, particularly those related to the employment rate, the business cycle and the Schengen
agreement.
4.2. Robustness checks
4.2.1. Data homogeneity issues
In our baseline regression, we use a mix of OECD and UN data, with different criteria (res-
idence, citizenship, birth). In order to validate this choice, we perform two main kinds of
robustness checks: First, we exclude observations from data collected by the OECD and focus
on UN data only (which implies that a set of destinations are left out of the analysis). This
corresponds to columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) of table 2. Second, focusing on the UN data
only, we further restrict our attention to one single criterion, namely the residence one, which
means losing around 40% of UN observations. This choice enables, among other things, to
include return migrants, i.e. natives coming back to their home countries. This corresponds
to remaining columns of table 2: 3rd (scaled OLS, HP filter), 4th (scaled OLS, annual growth
rates), 7th (OLS, HP filter) and 8th (OLS, annual growth rates).In all cases, we consider
dyadic and origin-time fixed effects.
[Table 2 about here.]
On the whole, if we compare the coefficients (+/- 1.96*standard errors) of columns (1), (3),
(5) and (7) between them and with columns (1) and (3) of Table 1, results are quite robust,
even if coefficients of wages and business cycles are somewhat magnified. Conducting the same
26The measure of the cycle differential is given by the differential in growth rate.
27More precisely, the removal of Spain from the sample tends to decrease the magnitude of the impact of the
employment differential (but not its statistical significance). This can be rationalized by the fact that Spain
is precisely a country having attracted a lot of migrants due to the economic boom and an improving labour
market, especially in the 90’s and the years prior to the financial crisis. This is well documented in Bertoli
and Fernandez-Huerta Moraga (2013a).
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comparison involving columns (2), (4), (6) and (8), we see that coefficients are even closer to
the ones of columns (2) and (4) of Table 1. The only cases of significant differences are for
the Schengen coefficients with a smaller magnitude, which may be explained by the fact that
we exclude several Schengen members (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovenia and Switzerland, for different periods) by sticking to the residence criterion
of UN data.
As a complementary robustness check with data, we have performed regressions putting aside
the observations for 2009 and 2010, since these recent years may be incomplete, due to the
time needed for data collection and processing. The results obtained, which are available upon
request, are once again robust.
4.2.2. Illegal migration and cross-border workers
By definition, illegal migrations are not included in our data. In our study, this problem is
probably mitigated by the fact that we focus on migration between mostly developed countries
where illegal migrations are limited (especially compared to cases such as migrants fromMexico
to the United States) and that a sizeable part of our sample is between members of the
Schengen area, where migration is free.
Yet, since this may be a concern in some cases (current members of the Schengen area have
not been concerned by free circulation over the whole period), we have decided to perform a
robustness check, in which we exclude observations for which we can expect illegal migrations
to be a significant share of the bilateral flows. Since there is no single source about illegal
migrations, we have relied on two kinds of sources: country specific reports (US, Norway, Swe-
den) and area-specific reports (such as the Clandestino report for a subset of EU countries).28
To perform as convincing robustness checks as possible, and given the uncertainties linked to
the measures of illegal migrations, we have chosen to be conservative, namely in case of doubt
about the importance of illegal migrations for a given source and destination country, we have
excluded the related flows.
Results, as shown in column (1) and (2) of Table 3 with HP filter and annual growth rates
are robust compared to column (3) and (4) respectively of Table 1. For the sake of simplicity,
only OLS regressions have been reported in Table 3.
Another issue which is disregarded in the benchmark regressions is the treatment of cross-
border workers. Cross-border migration might indeed involve a different process, compared
to the usual economic migration. Following the same strategy used above, we reestimate the
model excluding the observations for which cross-border workers represent a significant share.
This identification of this significance relies on reports, mainly one for the EU-27 and another
one on cross border workers between the US and Canada. Once again, results, as shown in
column (3) and (4) of Table 3 with HP filter are robust compared to column (3) and (4) of
28More details about the sources are given in Appendix A
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Table 1.
Taking into account these two issues (illegal migrations and cross-border workers) simultane-
ously , we perform a third set of robustness checks in which we exclude all the origin-destination
observations for which at least one of these mobility flows represents a significant part of the
recorded flows. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3 (columns (5) and (6)),
which are quite similar to the results of the benchmark regressions in Table 1.
[Table 3 about here.]
4.3. Caveats: endogeneity and network effect
4.3.1. Endogeneity
One traditional concern in terms of estimation of models such as model (12) is the occurrence
of endogeneity. In particular, given the focus of the paper, the potential endogeneity of the
aggregate fluctuations should be assessed with great care. For the sake of understanding, it is
nevertheless important to identify the sources of endogeneity in this context. Basically, two
traditional sources can be considered : (i) reverse causality from international migration to
aggregate fluctuations and employment rates and (ii) endogeneity due to omission of factors
(due to inobservability for instance) that could be correlated with aggregate fluctuations. One
important factor of this kind involves unilateral immigration policies.
4.3.2. Reverse Causality
One particular concern is whether international migration can affect the economic conditions,
i.e. whether there is a reverse causal relationship from international migration to economic
fluctuations and employment rates. One important reason for which this concern is mitigated
here is that we rely on bilateral migration flows. Migration flows at the bilateral level remain
quite modest with respect to the size of the labour market and the goods market, either at
origin or at destination. To illustrate, in our sample, only 6 bilateral flows out of 690 are
over the 50,000 threshold. Out of those 6 flows, 3 flows concern Germany as the destination
country, with obviously the case of Russian and Romanian migrants in 1990s as outliers. Only
32 country pairs involve flows that are over 20,000 migrants. Those figures suggest than even
if economic migration can affect economic outcomes in general, the bilateral nature of our
analysis makes this concern much less serious than in unilateral analysis of migration. Even
in the unilateral case, the literature is in general very mixed about the potential effect of
immigration. To illustrate, the huge literature about the impact of immigration on domestic
wages (Borjas, 2006, Card, 2005, Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) is divided about the exact nature
of that effect. When conclusions in favour of some effects are drawn, the expected magnitude
on domestic wages remains quite modest in economic terms.
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4.3.3. Omission of unilateral immigration policies
In the estimation of model (12), immigration policies are explicitly accounted by the Schengen
agreement among EU countries as well as by the additional bilateral agreements captured by
the IOM database. These variables refer to bilateral policies, i.e. policies that are specific
to a particular migration corridor. They include preferential treatments often granted by
the host country. Due to absence of data, we do not capture explicitly the other dimension
of immigration policies, i.e. the unilateral dimension. These include immigration policies
that are conducted towards all the partner countries. Model (12) includes αit and αij fixed
effects but these do not capture the role of immigration policies conducted by the destination
country. One legitimate concern is that the omitted variable can lead to biased estimates.
The discussion is mainly about the expected magnitude of that possible bias.
The bias related to the omission of immigration policies materializes if these immigration poli-
cies are contemporaneously correlated with our business cycle measures. While one can expect
a positive correlation of liberal immigration policies and the business cycle over time, the tim-
ing of that correlation is more debatable. A contemporaneous correlation which is needed to
generate such a bias requires that the immigration policy and its implementation reacts within
a year to adverse or positive economic developments at the country level. While it might be
the case for some particular episodes, on average, the design and the implementation of such
immigration policies takes time. In other terms, an underlying assumption in our estimates is
that the contemporaneous correlation between unilateral immigration policies and the cycle is
quite low and requires more than a year to be of significant magnitude. Since this assumption
is important, we further assess its validity by focusing on a set of specific cases. More precisely,
we focus on the cases of four important countries: United States, Canada, Spain and France.
We adopt two complementary perspectives in that respect. We first consider national acts
(laws, decrees, ministries’ decisions...) related to immigration that are considered in the lit-
erature as potentially reactive to business cycles. We then conduct a complementary analysis
of national acts concerning visas, registered in the International Organization for Migration
database, and compare the dates at which these rules were passed along with peaks and toughs
of economic cycles. This comparison remains qualitative since it is very difficult to numeri-
cally code those acts (this depends among other things on the impact of their contents). This
analysis is fully detailed in the Appendix B.
The analysis leads us to conclude that the contemporaneous correlation of business cycles
and unilateral immigration policies is quite low. Appendix B illustrates from case studies the
various reasons for this low correlation. Among those reasons, even if policies account for the
economic cycle, there is clearly a time lag needed to pass the immigration laws. Also, while
business cycles might be a concern, a lot of immigration acts target non economic goals. This
is for instance the case for family reunification policies which affect a significant proportion
of migrants. From the whole analysis, we conclude therefore that the omission of unilateral
immigration policies should not invalidate the results of our empirical exercise.
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4.3.4. Migrants Networks
A second source of concerns is that specification (12) does not account for the effect of migrants
networks. Diasporas at destination are known to generate mechanisms that lower the migration
costs for the prospective migrants of their country of origin. This effect has been documented
in various papers dealing with macroeconomic data (Beine et al., 2011 among others). In those
models, the network is often captured by the size of the bilateral migration stock at the start
of the migration period. Most of the papers consider migration periods of ten years and use
either cross sectional data (Beine et al. 2011; Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2012)
or panel data (Beine and Parsons, 2014). In the context of this paper, bilateral migration
stocks are unavailable at an annual frequency, which explains the omission of the network
in specification (12). One question is whether this is detrimental for the estimations of our
models. In that respect, some comments are in order here.
First, the empirical literature emphasizes the variation of network elasticities across types of
migration processes. The network effect is obviously more important for unskilled migrants
and for South-North migration. While it is not negligible for North-North migration and
skilled migrants, the fact that we focus on migration flows among OECD countries makes the
omission of the network less serious. Second, at the annual frequency, migration stocks are
quite stable over time. These are for a lot of country pairs quite collinear to some fixed effects,
and in particular with the dyadic ones (αij). This implies that models with αij fixed effects
partly account for some implicit network effect. Finally, our observable variable capturing the
bilateral agreements is likely to be highly correlated with some of the bilateral stocks. In that
sense, part of the effect associated to the migrants networks is also reflected in the elasticity
of that variable.29 All in all, while the inclusion of the network variables should be desirable
if data were available, the specifications of our models and the sample of countries over which
estimations are conducted make the omission of those effects less concerning.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically test the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on migration
flows. We revisit an old issue but with a fresh approach building the recent advances in
the empirical literature on international migration. By contrast with some previous macroe-
conomic approaches evaluating the degree of labour mobility through indirect evidence, we
29Another possibility to account for the network effect would be to use lagged migration flows as a control
variable. There are nevertheless two weaknesses associated to that strategy. First, it is unclear how migration
flows correlate with stocks that proxy the networks. Second, using lagged dependent variables in panel data
models with fixed effects generates some bias in the estimated parameters. This is known as the Nickell bias
(Nickell 1981). The magnitude of the bias depends on the relative cross-sectional dimension with respect to
the time dimension. The higher the number of dyads compared to the number of time periods, the higher the
expected bias. Here we have 696 dyads (651 with missing data) and 31 time periods, which suggests that the
bias would be not negligible.
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adopt a more direct approach relating gross migration flows and macroeconomic fluctuations.
In particular, we rely on micro-founded gravity models that include the traditional long-run
determinants and take into account important concepts such as the multilateral resistance
terms. Our analysis looks specifically at the sensitivity of gross migration flows to relative
business cycles and relative employment rates. These variables act as signals in the formation
of expectations about future employment probabilities among prospective agents.
In particular we find evidence that relative business cycles and employment rates affect the
intensity of gross bilateral flows. Variations of these relative short-run factors driven by the
changes of economic conditions at the destination turn out to be important for the optimal
destination choices of the prospective international migrants. As a by-product of this analy-
sis, we also show that the introduction of the Schengen agreement and the inception of the
common currency in EU significantly raised the international mobility of workers between
the relevant countries. These results are important as they show that, compared to previous
studies conducted in the 90’s, labour mobility in EU seems to have increased and has become
more reactive to asymmetric shocks. This dimension is key in the traditional definition of an
Optimum Currency Area. This of course does not mean that Europe has become an Opti-
mum Currency Area but suggests that labour mobility as an adjustment mechanism is more
a reality than in the past. A caveat of this analysis is that we consider only homogeneous
labour. Due to data constraints, we are unable to evaluate the sensitivities to business cycle
fluctuation of agents distinguished by skill or education level. Such an investigation would
indeed be a natural direction for the future research agenda.
Appendix A - Data sources and details
A.1 International immigration data
Table (4) provides details on source of international immigration data by destination country.
Greater details are provided in the Banque de France WP version of the paper.30
[Table 4 about here.]
A.2 Sources of data capturing the bilateral agreements
[Table 5 about here.]
We build a variable taking a value of 1 for a couple of countries when a bilateral labour
agreement exists between these two countries, or when a general law easing foreigners’ entrance
has been passed. When no agreement or law exists, the variable is set to zero.
30This version is available at https://www.banque-france.fr/en/economics-statistics/research/working-
paper-series/document/453-1.html
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The main source is the International Organization for Migrations. The corresponding list of
agreements can be consulted at the following link: http://www.imldb.iom.int/changeLocale.do
This main source has been complemented with the information from the North America Free
Trade Agreement, which to a certain extent, facilitated labour migrations between the United
States and Canada after 1994.
On the other hand, important migrations exist between the members of the Commonwealth,
but without any formal agreement, as confirmed in an OECD source:
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/social-issues-migration-health/migration-et-emploi_9789264108707-
fr
In this latter case, the variable taking into account bilateral agreements does not take the
value of one because these agreements are only implicit and, as this situation existed already
before the beginning of the period under review in our article, there is no variability over time.
Thus, these implicit agreements are absorbed by dyadic fixed effects.
A.3 Sources of data capturing illegal and cross-border migrations
Sources used to identify suspected illegal migration country-pairs are given in the table below.
[Table 6 about here.]
In order to conduct robustness analysis we use two sources to identify the observations for
which cross-border workers represent a significant share. The primary source of identification
relies on a scientific report from the European Commission on the mobility of cross-border
workers within the EU27/EEA/EFTA countries published in 2009. We complement this in-
formation with a report on cross-border workers between the US and Canada.
Appendix B - Analysis of legal acts related to immigration and visas
In order to analyze the potential impact of business cycles on migrations acts among the
countries in our sample, we focus on the cases of four important countries, namely the United
States, Canada, Spain and France. With this sample, two non-European and two European
countries are covered and they all have a sufficient size and/or large enough immigrations flows
to be somewhat representative, though having their own characteristics. To that purpose, we
use two complementary perspectives.
We first consider national acts (laws, decrees and ministerial decisions) related to immigration
that are considered in the literature as reactions to business cycles. Canada seems to select
relatively more immigrants, and to set more quantitative limits that may be changed quite
rapidly, since these limits are likely to change merely by ministerial decisions. The United
States have also set numerical limitations for employment-based legal permanent residents,
23
but this number (140.000 immigrants a year, set by the Congress in 1990) has not fluctu-
ated since then. There are more fluctuations for specific cases like temporary reasons in the
United States, but fluctuations may be caused by non-economic motives (Cf. the events of
11th September 2001). As regards Spain, legal acts aiming at regulating immigration have
come late and were rather directed towards countries out of our sample. France seems to be
in an intermediate situation, since it indeed uses lists of workforce shortages to regulate eco-
nomic immigration, but indicators of job vacancies are set with a lag of one year and bilateral
agreements establishing lists of jobs in labour shortage concern mainly countries out of our
sample. Moreover, many immigrants in our sample still come to France for non economic
reasons (family reunification. . . ).
We also make a complementary analysis of national acts concerning visas, registered in the
International Organization for Migration database, and compare the dates at which these rules
were passed with the economic cycles. This comparison remains qualitative: we have chosen
not to give a value to these rules to include them in regressions because numerical values are
cumbersome to code (this depends among other things on the impact of their contents). As it
can be seen from the figure hereafter, we find that national laws about visas are not changed at
regular intervals and that these changes do not in general correspond to any particular pattern
of economic activity. This is due to a large extent to time lags between an economic downturn
and the moment when policies are decided and voted, which may involve a significant amount
of time.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Appendix C - Robustness check: estimations with dropped destinations
This section provides the figures relative to the robustness checks of the estimation of model
(12). The evolution of the coefficients can be used as indirect evidence in favour or against
the validity of the underlying IIA assumptions in the estimated specifications.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the estimated key coefficients of equation (12) when successively
dropping one destination country from the regression with growth rates. The upper-left panel
of Figure 3 plots the estimated values of the coefficient relative to wage differential, i.e. βˆ1 of
equation(12). The upper-right, lower-left and lower-right panels do the same for coefficients
βˆ2, βˆ3 and βˆ4 respectively.
[Figure 3 about here.]
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Table 1: Business cycles and migration: benchmark regression
Estimation Method Scaled OLS OLS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage 0.766*** 0.903*** 0.736*** 0.872***
(13.40) (15.04) (12.45) (13.99)
Business cycle 0.0067*** 0.019*** 0.0068*** 0.018***
(2.91) (6.77) (2.91) (6.11)
Employment rate 5.250*** 5.614*** 5.223*** 5.611***
(14.52) (18.32) (14.37) (10.70)
Schengen 0.252*** 0.243*** 0.262*** 0.252***
(11.66) (11.25) (12.03) (11.63)
EMU 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.140***
(4.88) (4.99) (4.94) (5.03)
Bilateral 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.094***
(4.36) (4.27) (4.22) (4.20)
Dyadic FE (αij) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin-time FE (αit) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 13483 13277 13416 13211
R2 0.952 0.952 0.951 0.951
RMSE 0.4723 0.4696 0.4745 0.4723
Estimated equation: equation (12). Estimation period: 1980-2010.
Dep. variable in (1-2): ln(1 +Nij,t). Dep. variable in (3-4): ln(Nij,t).
Business cycle measure: (1) and (3): HP filter.
Business cycle measure: (2) and (4): Annual growth rates.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust t-stats are provided in parentheses. RMSE means Root Mean Squared Error.
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Table 4: International immigration data sources and details
Destination country Data source Migration criterion
Australia UN Last country of residence
Austria UN Last country of residence
Belgium UN Country of citizenship
Canada UN Last country of residence
Czech Republic UN Last country of residence
Denmark UN Last country of residence
Finland UN Last country of residence
France UN Country of citizenship
Germany UN Last country of residence
Greece OECD Last country of residence
Iceland UN Last country of residence
Ireland OECD Last country of residence
Israel UN Country of citizenship
Italy UN Last country of residence
Netherlands UN Country of citizenship
New Zealand UN Last country of residence
Norway UN Last country of residence
Portugal OECD Last country of residence
Slovenia UN Country of citizenship
Spain UN Last country of residence
Sweden UN Last country of residence
Switzerland UN Country of citizenship
United Kingdom OECD Last country of residence
United States UN Country of birth
Note: UN refers to the data provided by the United nations population division.
More information is available on http://esa.un.org/unmigration/MigrationFlows.html
OECD refers to the data provided by the OECD International Migration database
This dataset is downloadable on http://stats.oecd.org/
Migration criterion specifies the definition of immigrants by destination country.
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Table 6: Sources used to identify illegal migration
Destination country Source for illegal migration
Australia Australian Government - Immigration department
Austria Clandestino project report 2009
Canada Focus migration
Czech Republic Clandestino project report 2009
EU 15 Report on the first phase (1 January 2007 31 December 2008)
of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2005 Accession
Treaty
Greece OECD SOPEMI report 2010
Hungqry Clandestino project report 2009
Italy Clandestino project report 2009
New Zealand Immigration Policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United States: An overview of recent trends by Ather H. Akbari
and Martha MacDonald
Norway Ministry of foreign affairs
Spain Clandestino project report 2009
Switzerland Office fédéral des migrations
The United Kingdom Clandestino project report 2009
The United States U.S department of homeland security
This table gives the references used to identify significant illegal immigrant flows to the destination countries.
This alllows us to perform robustness checks by dropping the country pairs for which we suspect significant illegal migrant flows.
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Figure 1: Number of missing (left axis) and zero (right axis) values for bilateral migration flows by destination
country.
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This figure plots the number of missing (left axis) and zero (right axis) values for bilateral migration flows by destination country.
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Figure 2: Business cycles and migration laws (United States, Canada, Spain and France)
 
This graph plots the evolution of GDP growth rates (quarterly growth rates cumulated over four quarters, %)
and dates of acts (represented by arrows) related to visas. It focuses on four major countries of our sample.
Source: IOM
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